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Fixed Rent Contracts in English Agriculture, 










This article conjectures a parsimonious explanation for the choice of fixed cash rent 
contracts in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century English agriculture. Tenant 
farmers, it is suggested, bore the brunt of the income risk because they were less risk 
averse than landowners. The latter’s acute risk aversion may have been produced by 
acute loss aversion brought about by their substantial fixed liabilities, part of which 
arose from signalling status. Limited quantitative evidence that landlords gave their 
tenants a risk premium, in the form of a low rent, is presented. Landowners apparently 
did not make especially frequent use of the formal short-term credit market as an 
alternative means of smoothing income, perhaps because the transactions costs of doing 
so were non-trivial. 
   3
1. Introduction 
A widely recognised stylised fact is that, in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century 
England, most farmland was leased by tenant farmers for a fixed cash rent, the contract 
often being renewable annually. The pre-existing system of copyhold and lifehold 
tenures was being run out, albeit slowly (Turner et al., 1997, pp. 24-32; Turner, 1998, p. 
3), owner-occupation was uncommon (Thompson, 2002), and sharecropping seemingly 
very rare (Burchardt, 2002, pp. 23-4; Griffiths, 2004, p. 82). Despite the extensive 
literature on the economic motivations underpinning contractual relationships, 
economic historians have not been attracted by the puzzle of explaining the widespread 
choice of fixed cash rent leases in English agriculture during the period under 
discussion. This article conjectures a parsimonious explanation, namely that landowners 
in England were more averse to income risk than tenant farmers. What follows is 
speculative not definitive in nature and is intended merely to highlight one 
interpretation of the currently available evidence, and should not be taken to exclude 
other accounts. If at all accurate, the argument has wider implications for the economic 
and social history of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century England because it emphasises 
differences in the entrepreneurial values and attitudes of landowners vis-à-vis farmers.  
 
2. Theoretical considerations 
Agency theory is the standard theoretical framework with which to explore contract 
choice. In this model, a principal (here a landowner) arranges with an agent (a farmer) 
to utilise a resource (land) to produce output (farm produce). The two parties agree on a 
contract that best fulfils their respective requirements.
1 In the last few years, scholars 
empirically investigating contract choice in historical and modern settings have tended 
to emphasise the importance of explanations based on transactions costs rather than the 
differing risk preferences of the principal and agent (notably Allen and Lueck, 1995,   4
1999; Ackerberg and Botticini, 2000). Indeed, Allen and Lueck (2002, p. 67) have 
briefly put forward an explanation of the general choice of fixed rent leases in historical 
northern European agriculture based on a transactions cost perspective: they argued that 
sharecropping was not required in this region because the type of husbandry 
predominantly practised (small grains and grass crops) meant that the landowner’s 
assets were not especially vulnerable to being overexploited by the farmer, unlike the 
orchard crops of France, Italy, and Spain, where the optimal contract needed to reduce 
the tenant’s incentive to excessively prune vines and trees. Most recently, however, 
some studies have concluded that the risk preferences of the principal and agent actually 
can be an influential determinant of contract choice (Ackerberg and Botticini, 2002; 
Hudson and Lusk, 2004). This article, developing the earlier analysis by Offer (1991b), 
suggests that such a line of contention may also be useful in helping to explain the 
choice of fixed rent leases in English agriculture between the mid-eighteenth and mid-
nineteenth centuries, providing an alternative or complementary account to that 
advanced by Allen and Lueck.
2  
It is a commonplace that a farmer signing a fixed cash rent lease is, in contract, 
exposed to the non-trivial income risks of farming. Stead (2004) has provided empirical 
evidence for the period under discussion supporting Offer’s argument that English 
tenant farmers were the residual claimants of agrarian income. There appears to have 
been only limited landlord/tenant risk sharing outside the legal tenancy agreement, for 
instance by the landlord granting rent remissions or arrears in bad years. The finding 
that eighteenth- and nineteenth-century landowners apparently wished to avoid income 
risk in agriculture by as much as was feasible provides an interesting comment on the 
extent to which they were enterprising capitalists, if only because definitions of an 
entrepreneur generally emphasise his inclination to take risks (Pollard, 1994, pp. 62-4).
3    5
The stylised facts of the English system, where the tenant farmer bore the brunt 
of the income risk, but not its entirety, are reminiscent of the predictions of a 
principal/agent model where the landowner is more averse to risk than the farmer. For 
the acutely risk averse landowner, letting his property at a fixed rent ensured, in 
principle, a certain rental income (unlike sharecropping or paying the farmer a fixed 
wage to cultivate land kept in hand). Yet because the farmer was somewhat risk averse, 
he is likely to have required from the landlord some limited insurance against, and/or 
compensation for, being exposed to a fluctuating income stream (Stiglitz, 1974; Currie, 
1981; Otsuka et al., 1992). Landowners’ granting of limited rent arrears and remissions 
provided the partial risk sharing element of the predicted agreement; some quantitative 
evidence that a premium, in the form of a reduced rent, was given to farmers for risk 
bearing will be provided in section 4 below. 
Why did landowners in England seemingly particularly dislike being exposed to 
income risk? A promising hypothesis for their acute risk aversion invokes the 
empirically well-established concept of loss aversion, developed in the seminal work of 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979). In their prospect theory, losses loom larger than gains 
in the decision-making process: the disutility from giving up some sum of money 
exceeds the utility received from acquiring the same amount. Loss aversion is 
conventionally graphically represented by figure 1, which shows a payoff valuation 
function that is strictly concave for income gains, strictly convex for income losses, and 
steeper in the domain of losses (Cox and Sadiraj, 2002, p. 14). As Rabin and Thaler 
(2001, p. 226) conclude, loss aversion therefore ‘directly explains why people turn 
down even very small gambles with positive expected value.’ (See also the literature 
surveys by Edwards, 1996; Starmer, 2000.) Furthermore, loss aversion – and hence risk 
aversion – can be particularly acute when an economic actor incurs large, and fixed, 
financial liabilities, assuming that he experiences disutility if he is unable to meet those   6
obligations. Thus, as Mokyr has written in another context (1983, p. 99): ‘It might be 
argued that the landlords were more risk-averse than their tenants because of their 
substantial fixed liabilities (e.g. interest charges, family settlements).’ Such reasoning, 
then, provides a potential explanation for English landowners’ preference for the stable 
farm rental income provided by fixed cash rent contracts. (For analogous types of 
arguments in other historical contexts, including the exploitation of coal seams by the 
minority of English landowners who had them on their estates, see Lornez, 1991, pp. 
918-9; Thompson, 2001, p. 39; White, 2004.) 
 
[figure 1 about here] 
 
The leading historians of English landed society have concluded that landlords 
did indeed have high fixed costs arising from factors like servicing debts. ‘[C]learly,’ 
wrote Beckett (1989b, p. 633), ‘[landowners’] unavoidable outgoings could be a very 
significant item.’ For Habakkuk (1994, p. 260): ‘Fixed charges made it more difficult 
for landowners to adapt … to an unfavourable turn of circumstances’, such as a fall in 
rents. A hitherto neglected implication of such statements is that English landowners 
might have demanded fixed rent leases. The next section presents more detailed 
empirical evidence indicating that the weight of landlords’ fixed liabilities was 
generally heavy relative to their gross annual income during the period under 
consideration. 
 
3. Landowners’ substantial fixed liabilities 
The three-fold categorisation of landowners’ outgoings by Beckett suggests that much, 
if not most, of their expenditure can be construed as representing some kind of fixed 
liability (1989b, p. 630). Some spending was outright ‘compulsory’, such as the   7
payment of taxes (unless the burden could be passed onto the tenantry). ‘Necessary 
outgoings’ comprised of expenditure on the maintenance of the estate, spending that 
was not fixed in an accounting sense but on which it was unwise to significantly 
economise in the long term. His third category, ‘ “optional” ’, included the ‘barely 
avoidable such as household expenses, portions, and jointures (which were of course 
compulsory once they had been agreed), together with legacies and annuities payable 
from an estate as the result of a will’. Such charges typically bore a far from trivial 
weight on a landowner’s gross annual income. Take two examples. Offer (1991b, p. 14) 
assumed that, after 1790, the costs of estate administration and maintenance (including 
taxation) absorbed 25 per cent of the yearly gross rent.
4 The size of jointures (an annual 
payment made to a widow until her death, settled at marriage) was commonly set at a 
fixed cash sum equivalent to about 20 per cent of a landowner’s total yearly gross 
income. A combination of the young age of wives at marriage and longer female life 
expectancy meant that the chances were that dowagers would be long-lived, perhaps 
surviving their husband for 12-16 years on average (Habakkuk, 1994, pp. 80-9, 258-60).   
Beckett believed that many other items of ‘ “optional” ’ outgoings were 
avoidable in theory but subject to important ‘social pressures’ in practice. Such status 
pressures on consumption were the subject of Veblen’s ([1899] 1994) famous signalling 
model. The ‘leisure class’, he argued, conspicuously consume in order to advertise their 
wealth and thereby obtain social approbation, since affluence is the most easily 
recognisable evidence of success. One lesser-known alternative view is that a consumer 
could instead be living up to a ‘character ideal’, consuming particular types of goods 
and services as part of a process of reassuring himself that he possesses some set of 
desirable personal qualities (Campbell, 1993, 1995). Campbell himself distinguished an 
eighteenth-century ‘aristocratic’ ideal of character ultimately derived from the ideal of 
‘the English gentleman’ which, among other things, emphasised displays of nonchalant   8
accomplishment, refinement, honour, and emotional restraint. Importantly, retrenchment 
is painful in both Veblen’s and Campbell’s models, not only because an individual has 
become habituated to his current levels of consumption, but also because economising 
entails a loss in social status and/or self-assurance.
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Unfortunately such models cannot be rigorously quantitatively tested (in the 
manner of, say, Basmann et al., 1988; Pellerin and Stearns, 2001) for the period under 
discussion because the required systematic data on the budgets or attitudes of the gentry 
and aristocracy are not available. Nevertheless, there is a substantial body of qualitative 
empirical evidence which suggests that these types of signalling and status 
considerations were of some general importance in the consumption behaviour of the 
various ranks of English landed society during 1750-1850, although they do not capture 
every expenditure decision made by every landowner. This evidence ranges from the 
novels of Jane Austen to historians’ detailed studies of the country house (Girouard, 
1978; Wilson and Mackley, 2000) and landscape garden (Williamson, 1995; Mowl, 
2000), the Grand Tour (Black, 1999; Dolan, 2001), foxhunting (Carr, 1976; Itzkowitz, 
1977), cricket (Birley, 1999; Underdown, 2000), London clubs (Taddei, 1999), the 
marriage market (Beckett, 1989a; Habakkuk, 1994), and politeness and the English 
gentleman (Girouard, 1981; Corfield, 1996; Vickery, 1998; Klein, 2002). For the 
purposes of this article, the importance of any ongoing expenditure on social signalling 
or personal reassurance – Lord Monson knew that expensive entertaining during the 
London season ‘must be kept up yearly or it has been to no use’ (quoted in Thompson, 
1963, p. 100) – was that it contributed towards landowners’ heavy financial obligations. 
Such spending effectively directly raised fixed costs over and above those that were 
fixed in an accounting sense, and indirectly served to increase the size of fixed 
accounting charges like interest payments (if, say, landowners borrowed to 
conspicuously consume). In the view of one contemporary (Howitt, 1844, p. 78):    9
 
Every man lives now-a-day for public observation. He builds his house, and organizes 
his establishment, so as to strike public opinion as much as possible. Every man is at 
strife with his neighbour in the matter of worldly greatness … shew [sic] is substituted 
for real happiness; and no man is valued for his moral or intellectual qualities, so much 
as for the grandeur of his house, the style of his equipage, the richness of his dinner 
service, and the heavy extravagance of his dinners.  The result of this is, that most are 
living to the full extent of their means, many beyond it  
 
Data on individual landowners, from the landed magnates to the lesser gentry, 
indicate that fixed charges typically absorbed a high proportion of their gross annual 
income (although an important caveat is that evidence about total income is inevitably 
imprecise). When John Beecher inherited property in Renhold, Bedfordshire, in 1751, 
taxation and repairs absorbed more than 30 per cent of the approximate £1,400 annual 
rental; for 15 years the estate was also subject to a jointure (Habakkuk, 1994, p. 392). In 
1779, taxes, repairs, and family payments took up over 30 per cent of Lord Grosvenor’s 
gross annual income of almost £20,000. He also had to meet interest payments on debts 
of £151,500, leaving ‘little over to meet his personal expenses’, let alone his £7,000 
yearly spending on racing. By 1795, the burden of fixed charges was even greater 
(Mingay, 1963, pp. 151-2). And between 1776 and 1806, taxes, repairs, and debt service 
reduced net income on the Cokes’ Holkham estate to between 54-64 per cent of gross 
(Beckett, 1989b, p. 633). Since these calculations omit current consumption and the 
other types of fixed costs mentioned above, these landowners’ income after 
‘unavoidable outgoings’ would have been even lower than the stated percentages 
suggest. Of course these and other examples given in the literature may be 
unrepresentative, even if the most obvious spendthrifts such as the fifth Duke and 
Duchess of Devonshire and the first and second Dukes of Buckingham are excluded.
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Yet, while some landed families did avoid chronic debt, the consensus view is that 
English landowners were a debtor class, with the borrowing being used to finance a 
range of expenditures from outright conspicuous consumption to industrial investments 
and marriage portions (dowries) (compare Cannadine, 1977a, 1980; Spring, 1980; 
Beckett, 1989a, p. 314; 2000; Allen, 1992, pp. 104, 264-5; Habakkuk, 1994, ch. 4; 
Spring and Spring, 1996).  
Thus national estimates are also indicative of high fixed costs. No contemporary 
opinion for the eighteenth century is known, but in the first half of the nineteenth 
century it was ‘commonly believed’ that land was encumbered to half its capital value, 
or approximately equivalently, that interest payments – perhaps also including some 
other fixed charges – absorbed half of the annual gross rent roll.
7 According to Richard 
Preston, a leading conveyancer: ‘Generally speaking, allowing that there are many 
exceptions from individual cases, the rental is for the most part burdened with 
incumbrances to one half of its amount by jointure annuities, the interest of portions and 
of mortgages, and of general debts, and the expense of management and repairs.’ Other 
authorities at this time – including Preston on another occasion – put the national 
fraction at about one half without explicitly including expenditure on estate 
management and repairs (Habakkuk, 1994, pp. 353-4; Rigg, 2004), and Caird made a 
similar claim for property in Essex (Caird, [1852] 1968, pp. 134, 417, 495). Mulhall 
(1884, p. 322) stated that, in 1866, land in England was mortgaged to 33 per cent of its 
value, with the current figure being 58 per cent. The most secure estimate, for the UK 
during 1904-14, puts mortgage debt at a substantially lower 27.4 per cent of value 
(Offer, 1981, tab. 8.1), possibly reflecting greater fiscal prudence amongst that 
generation of landowners. Tellingly, a figure of encumbrances on land to half of its 
capital value was seemingly regarded as the maximum that could be sustained. This 
was, for instance, the benchmark chosen by the House of Lords when amending the   11
Irish Encumbered Estates Act of 1848 (Habakkuk, 1994, pp. 354, 369). To the extent 
that these contemporary estimates are accurate, then, early nineteenth-century English 
landed society appears to have encumbered its estates to near the upper limit of 
prudence.  
The average landowner’s reluctance to significantly retrench, even when his 
financial situation was perilous, is another sign that a high proportion of outgoings were 
at least perceived as being largely necessary. Since retrenchment cost accustomed 
personal comforts and social standing, many attempted economy drives were frustrated 
by a landowner’s unwillingness to ‘drop out of his class’, as Habakkuk has put it (1994, 
p. 330), by making substantial savings through radical steps like moving out of his 
country house. Decisions were sometimes taken out of a landlord’s hands by placing his 
property in trust. But even trustees were ‘not always successful in restoring the position, 
and the most common cause of failure was the unwillingness of the [owner] to co-
operate’ (Mingay, 1963, p. 49). A classic example is the trust set up in 1832 to 
administer the finances of the first Marquess of Ailesbury, which ended up running his 
affairs until his death in 1856, a case ‘where carefully administered retrenchment was 
unable to produce any great surplus from income’ (Thompson, 1958, p. 122). Those 
trusts most successful in rescuing a family’s financial situation rarely did so quickly and 
often could only make substantial progress by raising revenue through asset sales, two 
stylised facts consistent with the hypothesis being tested in this section (Mingay, 1963, 
pp. 48-9, 125-30, 151-2, 155-6; Sturgess, 1982; Beckett, 1989a, pp. 301-9; Habakkuk, 
1994, pp. 304-34, 361-88). 
Finally, the supposition that landowners had sizeable fixed liabilities, and hence 
required a relatively stable flow of income, also predicts that nominal agricultural rents 
were sticky, especially downwards. A growing body of evidence supports this stylised 
fact, even for tenants holding under annual contracts, ranging from contemporary   12
comment – ‘a much longer term runs than fourteen years on an average, between one 
raisement [of a tenant at will’s rent] and another’ (quoted in Tuke, 1800, p. 57; see also 
Stephens, 1851, p. 510) – to Solar’s (2004) recent careful examination of the national 
time-series of rent compiled by Turner, Beckett, and Afton (1997) and Clark (2002). (In 
addition, see the discussions in Offer, 1991a, p. 117; Allen, 1992, pp. 181-6.) Of course, 
sticky rents are equally consistent with other models of the rent-setting process, notably 
Allen’s (2001, pp. 63-7) argument that landlords needed to credibly commit to 
infrequent adjustment of rents to reassure tenants on short-term contracts that they 
would earn a reasonable rate of return on their capital. Nevertheless it is another piece 
of evidence, albeit circumstantial in nature, that is supportive of the conjecture.  
This section has provided some, inevitably limited, qualitative and quantitative 
evidence which is very suggestive that English landed society in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries had ‘expensive habits’ (Habakkuk, 1994, p. 301). If fixed 
liabilities were a heavy burden on gross annual income, then it may not be surprising 
that England’s landowners preferred a steady rental income to a fluctuating one, and 
hence offered fixed cash rent leases to tenant farmers. The next section explores how 
equilibrium in the market for tenancies might have been achieved.  
 
4. Farmers’ supply of fixed rent contracts  
Why did so many farmers across England sign contracts that handed them the 
substantial risks of agricultural cultivation? Offer (1991b, pp. 10-2) highlighted the 
bargaining advantages landowners possessed over their tenants which gave them control 
over various aspects of the tenancy agreement, including the allocation of risk. For 
example, once a bargain had been struck, and the farmer had committed to the land, exit 
was more costly to him than to his landlord. The tenant’s higher withdrawal costs – 
such as the loss of specialist knowledge of a particular acreage – locked him into the   13
relationship and provided the landlord with the chance to act opportunistically. The 
generally relatively low rate of tenants’ turnover is one piece of evidence consistent 
with this analysis (Stead, 2003). An open question, however, is to what extent the 
bargaining strengths of the two parties were less unequal before the farmer had 
committed to the holding. There may well have been an excess supply of applicants for 
vacant tenancies, effectively allowing the landlord to dictate the terms of the contract. 
Yet Mingay (1962, p. 473) has generalised that, in the eighteenth century at least, 
tenants endowed with the physical and human capital necessary to successfully run a 
large farm tended to be scarce: ‘Normally … the landlord’s choice was very restricted: 
usually very few suitable farmers were to be found’.
8  
A detailed analysis of competition for vacant tenancies is beyond the scope of 
this article. Some scattered new evidence gives only an inconclusive picture. In 
Northumberland apparently sometimes just a single farmer applied for a holding (Bailey 
and Culley, 1805, p. 24). In 1814 the Reverend Middleton confessed ‘some Difficulty’ 
in letting the rectory farm at Brize Norton in Oxfordshire, but put this down to a fall in 
the price of corn.
9  Estate archives do not contain many lists of applicants for vacant 
tenancies. Eight men applied for the lease of Bottom farm (perhaps 165 acres) on the 
Drake family’s Buckinghamshire estate (year unknown), and in 1842, one of the Duke 
of Bedford’s agents listed eight ‘general applicants I have for a farm of this size’ 
(possibly 138 acres), four of whom had been on his waiting list for some time. Only two 
of Bedford’s eight aspirants could be easily ruled out, and the list was ‘long enough & 
good enough to choose from, without waiting for more applicants’. If representative, 
such evidence may well point to the excess supply of farmers needed to give landlords 
some control over contract terms. But these documents are a dangerous indicator to the 
extent that they were only compiled in cases of unusually numerous applications. 
Furthermore, only one of Bedford’s eight hopefuls was said to be soon without a farm,   14
suggesting that at least some applicants possessed outside options and hence a degree of 
bargaining power.
10 
If more research is required on relative landowner/tenant bargaining power 
before a tenancy agreement was signed, interestingly there is some limited evidence to 
support the conjecture in section 2 above that equilibrium was achieved by risk averse 
landlords compensating their less risk averse tenantry for bearing most of the income 
risk by payment of a risk premium. Any premium is most likely to have taken the form 
of a low rent that provided the farmer with an additional return on capital over and 
above the risk-free market rate, with the farmer using these implicit payments to build 
up a capital reserve to fall back on in bad years. Certainly on the Dudley estates it was 
recognised that the tenant should receive sufficient remuneration for ‘his labour, risk 
and capital employed’ (quoted in Turner et al., 1997, p. 21). Providing persuasive 
quantitative evidence of the existence of a risk premium is not a straightforward 
exercise. For instance, at the turn of the nineteenth century farm profits were perhaps 
twice the level available from low risk investments such as consols. Although tempting, 
it cannot be concluded that the gap indicates the presence of a risk premium because the 
involvement of other factors cannot be ruled out (Stead, 2004, pp. 355-6). 
A more useful method of attempting to isolate a risk premium is to compare 
rents under different estate management regimes. While some landlords did not share 
risks with their tenantry by allowing rent arrears, others were more willing to do so. The 
hypothesis is that landlords who never shared risk through arrears gave a higher risk 
premium to their tenants than those who did share some risk via arrears. As a pilot test, 
comparisons were made of rent per acre on matched pairs of estates owned by the same 
family, where on one estate the family never granted arrears over a substantial run of 
years, whilst on the other property during exactly the same time period arrears were 
allowed.
11 Rent data collected by Turner, Beckett, and Afton allow pair wise   15
comparisons to be made between two estates owned by the Leveson-Gower family, and 
six estates owned by the Pierrepont family, for various sub-periods between 1751 and 
1850. The estates are Lilleshall in Shropshire; Trentham in Staffordshire; Adwick in the 
West Riding of Yorkshire; Beighton in the West Riding and Derbyshire; Bradford in 
Wiltshire; Holme Pierrepont in Nottinghamshire; Lincolnshire, Crowle, and 
Basingthorpe in Lincolnshire and the East Riding; and Thoresby in Nottinghamshire.
12 
The representativeness of these eight estates largely located in the pastoral northern 
counties, and the two aristocratic families that owned them, is open to question (for 
information on the sample, see Mingay, 1963; Wordie, 1981, 1982; Beckett, 1989a; 
Habakkuk, 1994), but no other data were easily available. 
The simple exploratory regression model is: 
 
  it it it it e T D T D R Ln + + + + = ) . ( ) ( 2 1 2 1 β β α α       
 
where  it R  is rent per acre (measured in pounds) on estate i at time t; D is a dummy 
variable equal to one if tenants on estate i did not receive arrears over the entire sample 
period, and zero otherwise; T is a time trend; and e an error term. If tenants to whom 
landlords never allowed arrears received a larger risk premium than tenants who were 
granted arrears, then  2 α  should be negative, indicating that rent per acre on non-arrears 
estates was lower than on estates where arrears were given. It is also interesting to test if 
2 β  is negative, such that for some reason (possibly as part of the risk allocation deal) 
rent per acre rose more slowly on non-arrears estates. Following Clark (2002) and Solar 
(2004), the regression has the logarithm of rent as the dependent variable in order that 
the estimated coefficients on the dummy variables can be interpreted as showing the 
percentage difference in the level of rent.
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Lack of data on other potentially important right-hand-side variables means that 
the regression equation makes absolutely no claims for sophistication or completeness. 
Another problem is that, due to the possible endogenity of the dummy variables, it must 
be assumed that the decision to have been a non-arrears estate was predetermined (i.e., 
the landlord had credibly committed not to grant arrears despite any subsequent requests 
from the tenantry). The model assumes that the decision not to allow arrears caused 
(perhaps) low and slowly rising rents, but conceivably the causation can be reversed 
(tenants never required arrears because of a soft rent regime). Practical problems 
preclude controlling for possible endogenity, yet perhaps the assumption of a 
predetermined arrears regime is not completely outrageous. The sample sub-periods for 
the non-arrears estates range from 12-36 years. With so long a time without a single 
pound of rent arrears being received on the entire estate, it is perhaps difficult to argue 
that this regime was not predetermined. Suppose the landlord had not predetermined to 
always refuse arrears. Considering the risks of agriculture, it was a very fortunate 
tenantry that over as long as a generation did not experience at least one farmer 
suffering at least one exogenous loss deemed worthy of a small amount of arrears. 
Finally, interpretation of the coefficients is further complicated by the possibility that 
the rent set included an element for expected default on arrears, in effect a means of 
landlord risk sharing additional to the granting of arrears with full payment in time 
(Stead, 2004, p. 352). A useful exercise, therefore, is to estimate the regressions for rent 
actually received as well as for rent due, since the former incorporates actual defaults.  
 
[tables 1 and 2 about here] 
 
Table 1 presents the results of 12 pair-wise comparisons of rent due per acre on 
matched pairs of arrears and non-arrears estates in various sub-periods; table 2 shows   17
the same comparisons when the analysis is repeated using rent received. Prais-Winsten 
estimates were used because the Durbin-Watson d-statistics indicated the presence of 
serial correlation. The limitations of the data and model mean that the results of this 
exercise cannot be conclusive, and anyway there is only mixed support for the existence 
of a risk premium. Exactly half of the estimated values of  2 α  in table 1 are negative and 
statistically significantly different from zero, in accordance with the hypothesis, with 
rent per acre on a non-arrears estate being set up to 53 per cent lower than on an arrears 
estate. The results for rent received are similar suggesting that, where landlords set 
higher rents on arrears estates, this was typically done not just to take into account 
expected defaults on arrears, but also because the granting of arrears per se had an 
insurance value (assuming that the extent of default was not systematically 
overestimated). Thus five of the 12 calculated values of  2 α  in table 2 support the 
hypothesis, with the largest gap being put at 52 per cent. There is also some tentative 
indication from the estimates of  2 β  that rent per acre on non-arrears estates rose more 
slowly compared to estates where arrears were given. The safest conclusion to be drawn 
from tables 1 and 2, and this section more generally, is that additional research is 
required to establish why so many English tenant farmers signed fixed cash rent 
contracts.  
 
5. The credit market counter-argument 
English landowners, it has been conjectured, desired a steady rental income stream to 
ensure that they were able to meet their sizeable fixed liabilities. This broadbrush 
supposition is open to numerous objections, caveats, and counter-arguments, and this 
article cannot address them all. This penultimate section considers just one of the most 
obvious objections, namely that landowners could instead have smoothed their 
consumption using the short-term credit market (see Melton, 1986). A first cut at the   18
historical record, though, does not provide a great deal of support for this alternative 
hypothesis. Much evidence from the formal capital market – unsatisfactorily focused on 
here due to space constraints and the far superior sources – suggests that the bulk of the 
debts incurred by landowners were long-term, especially mortgages. This is, for 
instance, the general impression given by the profile of loans by insurance companies to 
members of English landed society (Dickson, 1960, ch. 12; Supple, 1970, pp. 73-5, 312-
30; Trebilcock, 1985, pp. 618, 630-54, 727-43).  
One simple test of the credit market counter-argument is whether landowners 
regularly received short-term bridging loans. Individual examples can be found, as 
when the Duke of Beaufort borrowed £24,000 from Hoare’s Bank on 14 February 1842 
and repaid the sum four days later (Cannadine, 1977a, p. 636). Yet a reading of the 
literature suggests that many landowners’ loans were renewed rather than being swiftly 
repaid, turning what was ostensibly a short-term credit into an instrument of long-term 
finance. Indeed, a popular act was to consolidate short-term debt into a long-term 
mortgage. (See the studies cited in this section together with Joslin, 1954; Brunt, 2004.) 
Some support for such arguments is provided by new data derived from a sample of 260 
loans made to 99 titled customers by Child’s Bank in London during 1745-92.
14 This 
sample provides a good proxy for aristocratic landowners but unfortunately does not 
capture the behaviour of lesser landowners.  
The majority of the loans from Child’s were made on the security of a personal 
bond (58.5 per cent of loans), followed by mortgage (15.1 per cent), and then 
promissory note (13.6 per cent), although unsurprisingly the most substantial sums were 
borrowed on mortgage: the mean thus lent was £9,092 compared to £2,726 on bond. Of 
all the loans, 83.5 per cent were recorded as being repaid in full, with the mean duration 
of a repaid loan being 2.7 years (median one year); 14.2 per cent of all loans were 
repaid within three months, and 27.3 per cent were repaid within six months. These   19
repayment statistics, though, must be interpreted with caution because a number of 
debts were repaid only through consolidation, as when the Duke of Bridgewater 
obtained a £15,000 mortgage on 19 June 1765 and the next day repaid five loans, 
totalling £15,000, which Child’s had made to him on bond over the previous eight 
years. Of the 16.5 per cent of all loans still owed, these had been outstanding for a mean 
of 8.8 years (median 7.6 years), with the longest owing for more than 39 years. In 
similar vein, the ledgers of Drummond’s Bank (another London bank with a significant 
aristocratic clientele) for the sample years of 1751, 1773, and 1815, list a number of 
loans outstanding from titled customers: in 1815, there were 93 such loans (mean 
amount £1,969), with a mean duration to date of 8.7 years and the longest owing for 
over 44 years.
15 
On 110 occasions the originally intended length of the Child’s loans was stated. 
Their mean duration was supposed to be 5.1 months (median six months). In practice, 
72.5 per cent were not paid on time, with the mean time overdue being 2.7 years 
(median 1.1 years), more than six times the originally specified length. An extreme 
example was a £12,000 loan to the Duke of Manchester, supposedly for six months, 
which was taken out in August 1757 but not repaid until February 1766. Moreover, 
Child’s titled customers did not regularly take out loans from the bank. A loan was 
given every 4.1 years (median 2.1 years), and tellingly only 22.4 per cent of customers 
took out more than one loan a year. For instance, Sir James Dashwood obtained just one 
loan from Child’s between June 1764 and June 1766. Aristocratic landowners’ use of 
overdrafts was also apparently relatively infrequent. The fifth Earl Cornwallis’ totalled 
annual balances with Hoare’s during 1814-43, for example, were never negative.
16 
Some systematic evidence was assembled from a sample of 57 titled customer’s bank 
accounts at Child’s in 1751 and 63 at Drummond’s in 1773. Of the 170 observations on   20
bank balances (that year’s opening and closing balances at Drummond’s, and mid-year 
balances at Child’s), just 13 were in the red.
17  
Some speculations can be made as to why landowners seemingly did not make 
more frequent use of the formal short-term credit market. On the demand side, it is 
conceivable that they had concerns over the possibility of loans being suddenly and 
inconveniently called in (for actual or threatened examples, see Cannadine, 1977a, p. 
635; Beckett, 1989a, p. 310; Habakkuk, 1994, pp. 515, 531). Supply side restrictions on 
the issue of credit must have been more influential. In particular, strict settlement 
limited the ability of an owner to encumber the family estate except for specified 
purposes, such as paying for marriage portions, and at least 50-70 per cent of land in 
England was subject to strict settlement during the period under discussion (Habakkuk, 
1994, pp. 47-8). Landowners thus constrained had to borrow on their personal credit, 
but here on at least some occasions they must have felt the sharp end of conditions 
conducive to credit rationing: a legal maximum nominal interest rate and substantial 
government borrowing to fund wartime expenditure (Joslin, 1960; Clark, 2001; Temin 
and Voth, 2005). Hence Drummond’s records contain examples of loan requests by 
landlords ‘not consented to’, even in peacetime years.
18 
Perhaps, then, most landowners at most times were able to obtain credit, but 
often it took some trouble to obtain the full sum desired: the transactions costs of 
borrowing on the short-term capital market may well have been non-trivial. To raise 
sufficient sums, landlords might have had to tap multiple sources, a speculation 
consistent with the limited repeat borrowing at Child’s Bank and also with the long lists 
of creditors on many debtor’s records.
19 It is tempting to claim that, faced with the 
prospect of incurring non-trivial transactions costs by smoothing income through the 
short-term credit market, landlords instead preferred to force, or pay, tenant farmers to 





This article has suggested one explanation for the widespread, but not universal, choice 
of fixed cash rent contracts in English agriculture during 1750-1850. Landowners, it has 
been conjectured, disliked a fluctuating rental income because they incurred substantial 
fixed liabilities such as mortgage interest payments and family charges, part of which 
arose from conspicuous consumption to signal wealth (following Veblen) and/or 
reassurance of conformation to an aristocratic/gentlemanly character ideal (Campbell’s 
claim). One possibility is that landlords compensated tenants for bearing risk by giving 
them a risk premium in the form of a low rent. Landowners apparently did not make 
especially frequent use of the formal short-term credit market as an alternative method 
of smoothing income, perhaps because of the non-trivial transactions costs of borrowing 
in a period where conditions were ripe for credit rationing. The various steps in the 
argument rely on limited and sometimes circumstantial empirical evidence, and are 
subject to a wide variety of caveats and counter-arguments. If at all accurate, though, 
the claims in the preceding pages cast important light not only on the business of 
farming in England but also on the entrepreneurial attitudes of English landed society. 
Of course, much additional testing of this broadbrush conjectural explanation is 
required in regard to, among other things, regional nuances, the role of the estate 
steward, differences between large and small landowners, and the size of the farmer’s 
fixed costs. The model also ought to be able to help to explain general changes over 
time in contract choice, notably the gradual shift away from copyhold and lifehold 
contracts from the early eighteenth century, and the move to short – increasingly annual 
– fixed rent leases that was in progress by the turn of the nineteenth century. Previous 
work has already suggested that considerations of risk were an influential element in the 
abandonment of long leases: experience of the years of fluctuating and then falling   22
prices during and after the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars naturally led 
both landlord and tenant to prefer a short agreement to a long-term commitment 
(Beckett, 1989a, p. 187; Overton, 1996, p. 156). It is less straightforward to use the 
explanatory framework to help account for the shift away from, say, leases for three 
lives, where the tenant paid a nominal annual rent and much higher entry and renewal 
fines (levied when a new lease was granted or when another name was added to the 
agreement). One very speculative suggestion draws on Allen’s research (1992, pp. 102-
4), and interprets fine-based contracts as a compromise between landowners’ desire to 
avoid risk (tenants were the residual claimants but the landlord experienced a 
fluctuating income because revenue from fines was irregular) and to borrow long-term 
using land as security (since fines in effect served as loans from tenant to landlord). The 
late seventeenth-century development of the mortgage market made the credit function 
of the fine-based lease unnecessary, allowing landowners to run out such agreements 
and shift to letting their property on contracts that provided a more stable flow of rental 
income. Such an argument might perhaps complement other explanations for the change 
(e.g., Clay, 1981; Nicolini, 2004, pp. 139-40). 
Another crucial test is whether the model stands up to international comparisons. 
Landed elites on the European continent also conspicuously consumed and their estates 
could be heavily mortgaged, the same sorts of expensive habits that arguably drove a 
demand for fixed rents in England, yet such contracts were far less common (Blum, 
1978). Open questions here are whether English farmers were for some reason better 
able to manage price and output risk than their continental counterparts, and to what 
extent landed society in England was especially addicted to conspicuous consumption, 
for example because competitions for approbation were particularly intense in a society 
that was open to new entrants, unlike in the rest of Europe (Thompson, 2002, p. 126). 
Further investigation of these and other lines of inquiry may well entirely disprove the   23
suggestions made in this article. Yet economic historians, like English tenant farmers, 
sometimes need to take a risk. 
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1 Formal presentations of the model abound. All references to ‘he’ or ‘his’ should be 
read as including ‘she’ and ‘her’. 
2 For simplicity, what follows abstracts from the issue of whether or not farmland was 
enclosed. See Bekar and Reed (2003). 
3 The literature debating the extent to which the values of English landed society 
inhibited the drive for economic growth is very extensive. Wiener (1985) was an 
influential text; Thompson (2001) provides an excellent recent critical survey.  
4 Compare the estimates for individual estates in Mingay (1963, pp. 81-3, 178-9); 
Thompson (1963, pp. 226-7, 235-7); Beckett (1989a, pp. 198-204); Clark (1998, pp. 71-
3). Also see Mingay (2000b). 
5 For examples of ideas of habit or signalling social status through consumption 
incorporated in the economics literature, see Bagwell and Bernheim (1996); Hodgson 
(1998); Cooper et al. (2001). 
6 For other examples, see York City Archives, M31/458, financial statement, probably 
of Sir William Robinson, 1764; Bateman (1879, pp. xxiii-xxv); Thompson (1958, tab. 
1); Mingay (1963, pp. 128-30); Cannadine (1977a, tab. 2; 1977b); Beckett (1981, p. 37; 
1989a, pp. 307-8); Wordie (1981, p. 238); Sturgess (1982, pp. 183-4); Habakkuk (1994, 
chs 4-5); Spring and Spring (1996, pp. 385-6). 
7 Equivalent assuming land was capitalised at 30 years’ purchase and mortgages yielded 
3 per cent. Habakkuk (1994, pp. 368-9). 
8 Similar generalisations have been made for the periods 1660-1750 (Wrightson, 2000, 
p. 284) and 1850-1914 (Mingay, 2000a, p. 765). 
9 Christ Church Archives, Oxford, MS Estates 64, fo. 86, Rev. B. Middleton to R. 
Morrell, 28 September 1814.  
10 Bedfordshire and Luton Archives and Record Service, Bedford, R2/4, map reference 
book, c. 1830, fo. 16; R3/4574/1-2, letter from Mr Bennett, 18 June 1842; Centre for   25
Buckinghamshire Studies, Aylesbury, D/DR/2/195, 219, 227, list of applicants and farm 
particulars, undated and 1766. 
11 Why such a difference in regimes occurred is an interesting issue for future 
investigation. 
12 Turner et al. bear no responsibility for the following analysis and interpretation of 
their data. 
13 Qualitatively similar results were obtained from a linear specification.  
14 The Royal Bank of Scotland Group archives, London [hereafter RBS], GB CH/203/1-
5, profit and loss ledgers. Titled customers include Earls, Dukes, and Sirs, and exclude 
the vague Esquire and Gentleman.  
15 RBS, GB DR/427/30, 67, 251, customer ledgers.  
16 Centre for Kentish Studies, Maidstone, U24/A59, bank pass books. For another 
example (for a much shorter time-series), see Pressnell (1956, tab. 20). 
17 RBS, GB CH/194/16, GB DR/427/66 (surnames A-H), customer ledgers. The Child’s 
bank balances were calculated at various dates depending on when was most convenient 
from each customer’s entry. Both balance observations were not available for 
Drummond’s customers who had opened or closed their account. 
18 RBS, GB DR/320/4, memorandum book, 1833-47, fo. 24, entry for 7 March 1836. 
19 York City Archives, M31/458, financial statement, 1764; Beckett (1989a, p. 314); 
Healey (1992, p. 208); Muldrew (1998, pp. 104, 288). Although see a contrary 
statement by Beckett (2000), p. 753.   26
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Income gains  Income losses   37
Table 1. Regression estimates of the rent due per acre differential on pairs of the same 
family’s non-arrears and arrears estates, 1751-1850. 
Comparison
a Period  2 α   2 β  
2 R   S.E. N 




0.700 0.027  72 











0.958 0.005  40 
































0.792 0.069  70 











0.800 0.029  48 




0.625 0.032  48 




0.830 0.029  48 
Source: UK Data Archive dataset 3691, deposited by Turner, Beckett, and Afton. 
Notes: T-values in parentheses.
 a Non-arrears estate listed first. ** Indicates coefficient 
negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. * Indicates coefficient negative and 
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Table 2. Regression estimates of the rent received per acre differential on pairs of the 
same family’s non-arrears and arrears estates, 1751-1850. 
Comparison
a Period  2 α   2 β  
2 R   S.E. N 




0.813 0.044 72 











0.360 0.126 40 
































0.800 0.068 70 











0.812 0.031 48 




0.722 0.036 48 




0.889 0.044 48 
Source and notes: as table 1.    39
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 